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Abstract 
Trials and dangers faced by pedestrians and cyclists have not only created an impression of 
undesirable conditions, but have promoted arguments of injustice and inequality.  High rates 
of death and injury coupled with reporting of poor infrastructure and fear of the behaviour of 
other road users point to a plausible prima facie concern that pedestrians and cyclists suffer 
inequalities. Yet this appearance masks uncertainty about what factors are relevant in judging 
inequality and how these should be treated against potentially competing claims. This article 
develops a framework assessing conditions for walking and cycling according to a theoretical 
conception of political and social equality, and so providing a basis on which to make 
arguments for change in transport policy, planning and law.  In developing the framework we 
examine the relevance to equality of a range of factors, including measurement of road 
casualties, questions of responsibility to increase walking and cycling as means of 
contributing to pollution and carbon reduction, matters of fault and responsibility for road 
safety, and the economic impacts of improving conditions for walking and cycling.        
 
Keywords: Philosophy; equality; walking; cycling; risk; access     
 
1. Introduction 
 
The number of cyclists and pedestrians injured or killed in road accidents remains high 
despite some recent reductions (e.g. Roberts et al., 2002; WHO, 2009).  Lives lost or harmed  
is cause for concern, and there are questions of whether pedestrians and cyclists face 
disproportionate risks, particularly as compared to drivers and passengers of motor vehicles.  
Coupled with this, a range of studies have argued that broad conditions faced by pedestrians 
and cyclists should be understood as forms of inequality, inequity, or lack of social justice. 
These claims relate to fear of crime, and problems of severance and inaccessibility, 
particularly to services, employment and education (Whitelegg, 1997; Acheson, 1998; 
Bostock, 2001; SEU, 2003).  In this article we defend the argument that equality and social 
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justice should be used to assess conditions for pedestrians and cyclists. However we suggest 
that it can be difficult to move from identification of inequity or inequality faced by 
pedestrians and cyclists to an understanding of how these problems can justifiably be 
addressed. Consideration of the relevance and policy implications of apparent inequalities 
tends to be complicated by social and environmental benefits of walking and cycling, coupled 
with arguments about the legitimacy or viability of measures which could improve conditions 
for these modes. To mediate competing claims, and to make a defensible case for measures to 
tackle inequalities facing pedestrians and cyclists, we argue for a philosophical conception of 
political and social equality which can be applied to policy, planning and law affecting 
walking and cycling.  
This article was motivated by a three year project on Understanding Walking and Cycling 
which explored attitudes to, and experiences of, walking and cycling in four English cities.  
Its results suggested concerns that pedestrians and cyclists might face inequalities and 
certainly perceived that they did so (Pooley et al., 2011), but raised questions about how this 
could be adequately judged.  To illustrate some of the complexity involved in judging the 
relevance of apparent inequalities, consider how alongside the mortality, injury, fears and 
risks associated with walking and cycling there are a range of individual and social benefits. 
There are prospects of benefits to health through exercise (e.g. Hartog, 2010; Rojas-Rueda, 
et. al. 2011; de Panis, 2011; Kahlmeier et al., 2011) and from improved local air quality if 
transport pollution is reduced (COMEAP, 2010), to the economy in congested areas 
(Eddington 2006), and to carbon reduction (IEA, 2012; DECC, 2013). So, people might be 
encouraged to walk or cycle for self-interest reasons, especially for health benefits (e.g. de 
Hartog, 2010), or as acts of social responsibility (Blondel et al., 2011; Higgins, 2005). Yet 
even if the benefits mitigate risks and harms, there are questions about the reasonableness or 
plausibility of expecting uptake of walking and cycling if conditions are poor. Attempts at 
promotion are often coupled with attempts to improve conditions for walkers and cyclists 
(e.g. Pucher and Buehler, 2008; Hickman and Pharoah, 2011; Pooley et al., 2011), but 
questions remain about the sufficiency of improvements and the basis on which assessments 
of sufficiency should be made. These questions become more acute when measures to 
improve the lot of pedestrians and cyclists meet competing claims or concerns, for instance, 
that various restrictions on driving constitute an unjustified or politically problematic 
interference with individual choice (for instance, Hårsman and Quigley, 2010; Docherty and 
Shaw, 2011; Khayesi and Amekudzi, 2011).  
 
Recent years have seen developments in the use of political philosophy as a means of 
analysing questions in transport planning and policy (e.g. Wolff, 2002; Mullen, 2004; 2012; 
Beyazit, 2011; Martens, 2011; 2012; van Wee, 2011; 2012). However this work is still at 
relatively early stages and has tended to consider broad transport issues with consequent 
limitations to depth of debate and leaving significant questions about the application of 
political philosophy to specific areas.  A function of this article is to extend and deepen this 
debate by considering the application of one philosophical approach, to one aspect of 
transport.  So the scope is framed on one side by our limiting our investigation to walking and 
cycling as travel modes, and given their prominence, using motor vehicles as a comparison. 
While the framework we develop might be extended to other transport, we do not explicitly 
consider this extension.  On the other side we have framed the philosophical questions as the 
application of a conception of equality. The overarching reason for this focus is that it 
responds to existing concerns that pedestrians and cyclists face certain inequalities, inequities 
or lack of social justice. Our contention is that a philosophical conception can provide a 
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transparent framework capable of analysing and assessing the frequently competing concerns 
and claims surrounding policy and planning as it impacts on pedestrians and cyclists.  
In the next section we outline a broad conception of equality, describing its context in 
political philosophy and briefly exploring its application to transport policy, planning and 
law. The subsequent sections investigate how this conception might be applied to walking 
and cycling by developing an analytic framework. The framework serves two purposes, first 
providing criteria for judging whether apparent inequalities faced by pedestrians and cyclists 
should be considered relevant policy concerns.  Second, it provides a basis for judging how 
interests or claims of pedestrians and cyclists should be treated in the face of potentially 
competing concerns, such as interests of other road users, or questions of the economic 
impact of changes to support walking and cycling. In Section 3 we start to develop the 
framework, taking as a starting point the question of whether pedestrians and cyclists face 
disproportionate risks and levels of harm from road traffic collisions. We suggest our general 
account of transport and equality acts as a guide to using road casualty data in assessing 
relative levels of risks faced by transport mode.  Moreover the account also indicates the 
multiple questions of equality left unanswered by examining casualty data alone.  In Section 
4 we begin to tackle these questions, considering how equality frames assessment of where 
responsibility for safety or pedestrians and cyclists should be placed. We argue that wider 
impacts of transport on carbon emissions, on other pollutants and on the economy, can be 
relevant to this question by indicating that there may be a collective responsibility to 
encourage walking and cycling and therefore to reduce the physical risks faced by pedestrians 
and cyclists.  Finally in Section 5 we draw together the strands of the argument to develop a 
framework for judging the application of equal concern to walking and cycling. 
 
2. Transport and equality  
2.1 Theory of equality 
Political philosophy has a tradition of argument about the definition and justification of 
equality as a notion underlying political, social and economic organisation. This stems at 
least from Aristotle (Politics Book 3, XII) and is illustrated by articles asking ‘Equality of 
What?’ (Sen, 1979; and for instance, Cohen, 1990; Daniels, 1990; Arneson, 2010), ‘What is 
Equality’ (Dworkin, 1981), “What is the point of equality?’ (Anderson, 1999). Debate on 
equality is ongoing, and any conception will be subject to criticism by non-egalitarians and 
by egalitarians defending a differing conception.  So we aim to defend a theoretical account 
broad enough to be plausible to a range of opinion, while recognising the scope for debate.  
Thus we intend our argument to open up, rather than seek to settle discussion of equality and 
its application to walking and cycling.   
We start from the notion that each person has equal moral value, and therefore that 
governance and policy should be designed to show equal concern for each person (e.g. 
Harris, 1988, 1997; Dworkin, 2000; Mullen, 2009; cf. Cohen, 1989; Sen, 1993).  In the rest of 
this section, and in Figure 1, we outline broad characteristics or high level principles of equal 
concern. Adoption of equal concern implies development of political, social and economic 
organisation which recognises that people are entitled to access means of protecting and 
sustaining their lives (Glover, 1977; Harris, 1988, 1997). Moreover, since there is more to life 
than simply remaining alive, equal concern requires entitlement to some access to means of 
conducting the activities and projects that matter to people (Sen 1979, 1993; Cohen, 1989; 
Dworkin, 2000; Mullen, 2004). Questions of what it would mean to apply these two aspects 
of equal concern are influenced by a number of broad criteria. To begin, equal concern 
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requires that people will be ‘treated as equals’ rather than ‘treated equally’ meaning that 
provision should take account of people’s differing needs (Dworkin, 1977, p. 68). Dworkin 
makes the case for this criterion of equality through the following example:  
 
‘If I have two children, and one is dying from a disease that is making the 
other uncomfortable, I do not show equal concern if I flip a coin to 
decide which should get the remaining dose of a drug.  This example 
shows that the right to treatment as an equal is fundamental, and the right 
to equal treatment, derivative.’ (Dworkin, 1977, p. 68) 
 
Equal concern can be distinguished from theories, such as libertarianism, which maintain that 
people have a right to be free from direct harm and force, but that there is not an entitlement 
to be provided with means of sustaining life (see Nozick, 1974, pp. 30-4 and ch. 4).
1
 
Likewise, it goes beyond the idea that people should not be excluded from accessing means 
of conducting activities (e.g. by discriminatory laws), and implies distributive policies which 
provide each with some means of conducting activities and projects (see Figure 1, box [A]). 
Moreover this account of equal concern can be distinguished from ideas of equality that 
inform welfare economics, and which have been prominent in many policy sectors, including 
transport. A significant distinction between these accounts lies in the emphasis on showing 
equal concern in distribution, and in showing concern for each person despite loss of overall 
benefits.
2
  
There is debate on what level of provision and safety individuals are entitled to, and what 
responsibilities they have to provide for themselves and others (e.g. Arneson, 2010; 
Anderson, 1999; Cohen, 1990; Daniels, 1990; Dworkin, 2000; Roemer, 1993).  We limit our 
account to some broad points. First, equal concern implies that one individual’s entitlements 
may be limited by the equal entitlements of others (Figure 1, box [B]). Second, it is plausible 
to maintain that where they are capable, individuals have responsibility to contribute to 
providing for others (e.g. Dworkin, 2000; Harris, 2005; Mullen, 2009). One justification is 
that since people matter, we have some collective responsibility, through acts or omissions, to 
support their fundamental interests (Glover, 1977, pp. 96-97; Harris 2005;). Second, arguably 
this responsibility is shared, since if it falls on only a few people, then those few would be 
likely to face a burden substantial enough to mean that they no longer have the provision or 
safety that they are entitled to (Mullen, 2009). Third, where they are capable, individuals 
have some responsibility to provide for themselves since to fail to take such individual 
responsibility would impose an unfair burden on others (see Dworkin, 2000, ch. 2) (Figure 1, 
box [C]).   
 
2.2 Equal concern and its application to transport  
What might these requirements of equality mean for transport?  One approach is to begin by 
noting some broad features of transport which are relevant to equal concern.  First consider 
                                                          
1
 In this respect, equal concern might appear to place quite onerous demands on society.  Yet this is a misleading 
impression. The entitlements provided by equal concern are limited by the need to show equal concern to others, 
whereas in libertarianism there is an absolute right to be free of direct harm caused by others. Respecting this 
right can be extremely difficult if not unfeasible since many activities, such as polluting travel, impose direct 
harms on others (Railton, 1985).        
2
 The relationship and contrasts between conceptions of equality underlying welfare economics and other 
egalitarian approaches is subject of longstanding and on-going debate (see e.g. Cohen, 1990; Harris, 1988; 1997; 
Mullen 2004). It would not be feasible to engage in this debate within the scope of this paper.       
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the idea that concern should be shown for protecting each person’s life (see Figure 1, box 
[A]). We might begin to think about the application of this idea by looking at the transport 
related risks to which people are subject, and which they impose on others by using transport.  
As we discuss in following sections these risks include road traffic collisions, poor air 
quality, noise pollution and carbon emissions from transport, and potentially opportunity 
costs such as including land use and active lifestyles (see also Mullen, 2004, 2012). The 
distribution of risks is a relevant factor although, as we shall see, determining how it is 
relevant is not straightforward.  Absence of transport might also present risks since transport 
is among the means needed for access to basic needs of food, shelter, healthcare and security, 
for enabling countless social, economic, political and creative activities, and travel or the use 
of transport, can be an end in itself (e.g. Beyazit, 2011; Lucas, 2006; Mullen, 2004, 2012; 
Martens, 2011, 2012; Martins et al., 2012; van Wee, 2011, 2012).
3
 We benefit from a 
transport system carrying basic supplies, allowing fast access to emergency services, and 
more broadly supporting an economy which in turn provides goods, services and 
opportunities.  Yet both collective and individual benefits associated with transport can be 
unevenly distributed.  For instance, economic benefits are not equally distributed (Hills et al., 
2010; OECD, 2010), and differences in needs and preferences about where and how to travel 
can mean that the existing transport system offers better choices to some people than others 
(cf. Whitelegg, 1997).       
In aiming to treat each person’s life as (equally) valuable, it could be tempting to suggest 
seeking elimination of deaths from collisions and transport related pollution. The danger is 
that measures required to do this might involve restrictions creating a new set of deaths 
associated with a lack of available transport needed for accessing goods and services (one 
example might be restrictions which impact on accessibility to healthcare services, see for 
instance Acheson, 1998, part 2.5; Bostock, 2001).  So in the near term it may only be possible 
to limit transport related deaths.
 4
 Yet focusing on minimising death may not be sufficient 
unless we also consider whether some defined groups of people (e.g. in particular 
geographical locations or age groups) will be more exposed than others to risks of death.  The 
argument is that if it is known and accepted that some groups will face higher risks, then 
those people can claim they are not being treated as equals. Therefore, it has been argued that 
showing equal concern involves a further condition that we also attempt to reduce 
inequalities in the levels of physical risk to which different people are subject (Harris, 1988; 
Mullen, 2004, 2009).   
Since travel can be a crucial factor in enabling activities that make life worth living, equal 
concern will involve protecting access to transport (Mullen 2004, 2012, and see Beyazit 
2011; Martens 2011, 2012).  The criterion of access to transport need not involve any 
specification of what transport modes should be accessible.  A significant factor in thinking 
about what transport should be accessible is just the requirement that each person should have 
access to some travel. This could result in restrictions on certain transport modes if they 
amount to a barrier preventing others from accessing means of travel. Further accessibility 
                                                          
3
 We might try to list the diverse values that people gain from short and long distance travel, and the ways in 
which different people gain pleasure, knowledge, or meaning from walking or cycling or train journeys and so 
on.  However such a list would be partial and contestable and vary markedly from person to person (cf. Glover, 
1977, Ch. 2 part 7).     
4
 Over time it may be feasible to prevent all deaths from collisions without upsetting transport’s function in 
supporting basic means of living. The ambition to prevent all deaths from road traffic collisions was adopted by 
Sweden’s Vision Zero policy which ‘has a long-term strategy in which road safety is improved gradually until, 
over time, the vision is achieved’ (Peden et. al. 2004 p, 20). 
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places limits on methods for reducing transport related harm since our account of equality 
does not suggest that safety can take priority over some ability to conduct activities that make 
life worthwhile (Figure 1, box [A]). Neither does our account suggest that activities take 
priority over safety.   In other words, there is a need to consider both priorities together.       
So, our account of equality applied to transport involves two non-hierarchical priorities: that 
deaths associated with transport should be minimised, subject to the condition of avoiding 
inequalities in life-threatening risk, and that people should have access to some means of 
travel (Figure 1, boxes [D] and [E]) (Mullen 2004). Realising these priorities may, of course, 
involve behaviour change and restricting choice on transport use, however such restrictions 
might be justified by the high-level principles of equal concern (Figure 1, boxes [B] and [C]). 
These principles also provide a basis for maintaining that there is a collective responsibility to 
attempt to achieve these priorities (Figure 1, boxes [A], [B] and [C]). The question then, is 
what are the implications of these principles and priorities for policy, planning and law 
affecting conditions for pedestrians and cyclists?  
 
[Insert Figure 1: Principle of equal concern and its application to transport policy, planning 
and law] 
3. Judging inequalities in risk    
In this section we start by examining the application of the principle of equal concern to 
walking and cycling. Our starting point is consideration of how we might judge conditions 
according to the priority of minimising transport related deaths and inequalities in risks (i.e. 
Figure 1, box [D]). This section focuses on relative levels of road collisions by mode and 
health benefits of active travel.  We argue that these risks and benefits are fundamental to 
equal concern, however they are not the whole story and considering them in isolation leaves 
questions unanswered.  In the following sections we explore how these questions involve 
assessment of other factors, including indirect health impacts of transport, individual 
responsibilities, and an account of what sort of access to transport and travel people are 
entitled to expect. 
Let us begin by looking at the role, and limitations, of road casualty data in assessing relative 
levels of risks faced by users of different modes, and the relevance of these risks for our 
conception of equality.  As an example we use transport statistics from Great Britain.  First 
let us look at the number of accidents for distance travelled (cf. Pucher and Buehler (2010) 
who use this measure to compare levels of safety). For Great Britain in 2012, there were 38 
pedal cycle fatalities per billion vehicle miles, and 38 pedestrian fatalities per billion miles 
walked compared to 3 car occupant fatalities per billion vehicle miles and an average for all 
modes by road of 6 fatalities per billion vehicle miles (DfT and ONS, 2013, Table 
RAS41001).
5
  While deaths per billion miles for pedestrians, cyclists, and car occupants have 
tended to decrease from 2006-12, there remains a substantial discrepancy between fatality 
rates for pedestrians and cyclists compared to the average for all road modes and in particular 
as compared to car occupants.
6
 
7
 
                                                          
5 
This is the reported accidents figures given for car occupants and light goods vehicles. These figures have been 
combined to allow comparison with the National Travel Survey statistics on journeys by mode.     
6 
Although for pedestrians, car occupants and cyclists, the rates have not gone down every year when compared 
to the previous, for instance, for pedestrians the rate went from 37 in 2010 to 41 in 2011, for car occupants, the 
rate went from 3 to 4 over the same period, and for cyclists the rate went from 35 to 37 between 2009 and 2010.  
(DfT and ONS 2012, Table RAS41001).  
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There are several reasons for caution in using this type of data to assess whether risks are 
relatively disproportionate according to equal concern. First there are questions about what is 
being measured by the data sources cited. There is debate on the extent to which the British 
police road accident reporting system (STATS19) reflects actual numbers of pedestrian and 
cyclist injuries given underreporting (see Ward et al., 2006; Cavill et al., 2010, 2:3-2:4). A 
further caveat in using these data is that since they are aggregated figures from Great Britain 
they will mask a range of different local and individual circumstances affecting exposure to 
risk, and will limit the extent to which the measures can be claimed to reflect risks to which 
each cyclist or pedestrian is exposed.  
Second there are potential objections to measuring walkers and cyclists’ relative risk and 
safety as a function of distance travelled. These objections may be further divided into 
questions of whether distance is the most appropriate measure, questions about whether any 
measure should take account of other factors, such as health benefits associated with 
transport, or individual responsibility.  The first two are dealt with in this section, and the 
third in the next section.  
With respect to questions of whether distance is an appropriate measure for judging 
inequalities in exposure to risk, we might first consider whether instead we should compare 
rates of death and serious injury for time spent travelling (e.g. Wardlaw, 2002). Yet this 
appears a problematic measure since it would measure risk as varying in proportion (inter 
alia) to the speed of travel, and this relation would occur independently of whether people are 
exposed to new risks associated with travelling at higher speed. If priority for safety measures 
is influenced by the level of risk that a group is judged to face then, on this measure, priority 
would be influenced by the speed (again, independently of whether, or how, speed itself is a 
causal factor in risk).  This seems an arbitrary method of assessing priority.                 
A different approach would be to consider levels of risk for number of journeys undertaken 
by mode. In Great Britain in 2012, 22% of journeys were made on foot, compared to 64% of 
journeys made either as driver or passenger of a car or van (DfT, 2013, Table NTS0301). 
Pedestrians accounted for 420 of the 1,754 people killed on the roads in 2012, and car and 
van drivers and passengers combined accounted for 834 fatalities (DfT and ONS, 2013, Table 
RAS 40006). On this measure, we can compare the risk of a fatality suffered by pedestrians 
(measured as 420/22 =19.1) to that faced by car and van occupants (834/64 = 13).
8 
On this 
measure the inequality appears less disproportionate than a measure of risk for distance 
travelled, although there is still a substantial difference. For cyclists, the picture also slightly 
improved on this measure compared to one using distance travelled, since cyclists make up 
2% of journeys (DfT, 2013, Table NTS0301) and 118 fatalities (DfT and ONS, 2013, Table 
RAS 40006) so having a rate of 118/2 = 59. However fatality rates for cycling remain 
disproportionately high even when this measure of number of journeys is used.  
A measure of number of journeys may appear at odds with the requirements of equality since 
it does not differentiate between journeys of different length. Therefore it may not 
differentiate between a journey constituting a small part of life (e.g. a routine trip to the 
shops) and one making up a more substantial aspect of life (e.g. a journey across the country). 
So it risks being insufficiently sensitive to cumulative risks faced by some people in the 
course of making multiple short journeys. But if this objection is levelled at judging equality 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 
The casualty rate for motorcyclists per billion miles is also much higher than for all modes combined, this may 
also raise equality concerns. However consideration of this is beyond the scope of this paper   
8
 Dividing numbers of deaths by percentage of journeys/mode allows comparison of risk between modes 
however it does not show an absolute value for this measure of risk. An absolute value would need to include 
the actual number of journeys by mode, and this figure is not available.       
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according to level of risk by number of journeys, would there not be a similar objection to the 
idea of measuring risk by distance?  On the measure of risk for distance travelled, distance is 
being treated as a proxy for measurement of ‘getting on with life,’ or of the ‘extent to which 
the person is able to conduct activities which matter to them.’ There are potential problems 
with this proxy use of distance: for instance, it seems to privilege safety for people fortunate 
enough to live near to family, friends and work. The question then is whether we can tolerate 
the objections associated with using either distance or number of trips as a proxy, or whether 
neither will do? There is some reason for preferring a measure using distance, as to use the 
number of journeys would imply an assumption that longer journeys in motor vehicles tended 
to be (or at least were frequently) equivalent in ‘value’ to people’s lives to the shorter 
journeys made by people on foot. Consequently we might look to rates of death for distance 
travelled as an indicator for judging inequalities in risk, with the caveat that rates of death for 
number of journeys will also provide some insight into levels of inequality.   
As they are forms of active travel, frequently promoted for their health benefits (Pucher and 
Buehler, 2010; de Hartog, 2010; Panis, 2011) it could be claimed that walkers and cyclists are 
already (at least partially) compensated for facing high rates of injury in collisions.  At first 
sight this appears plausible since equal concern can be held to contribute to sustaining life (cf. 
Glover, 1977, pp. 96-97). However there are doubts that equal concern should involve 
offsetting risk in this way. First, some people have fewer options than others about how they 
travel, and travel by motorised or public transport can be limited by cost and availability 
(SEU, 2003; Bostock, 2001). Second while health benefits of exercise can be achieved 
through active travel, they can also be gained through non-travel related exercise (including 
walking and cycling solely for leisure, e.g. the practice of carrying a bicycle by car to reach 
‘safe’ tracks for leisure cycling). So while people with greater choice about their mode of 
travel can gain health benefits of exercise without suffering risks associated with walking or 
cycling as transport, this ability is not available to those relying on walking or cycling for 
travel. This difference can create inequality in people’s ability to gain health benefits while 
remaining relatively safe from collisions.   
 
4. Responsibility for safety of pedestrians and cyclists  
The section above indicates how we can begin to use equal concern to judge levels of 
physical risk and access to health benefit.  Broadly, the argument so far suggests equal 
concern for each person would be served by seeking to mitigate inequalities in risks faced by 
users of different transport modes.  Matters of mode choice and questions of fault have 
featured little in this argument.  Yet perhaps they should have. In other words, should 
measures of inequality discount harms occurring to people held to be at fault or in some way 
responsible for their injury?  The concept of equal concern suggests people have some 
responsibility for protecting their own safety and interests, but the question is how much?  
This question might be understood in two ways. First, if walking and cycling are relatively 
dangerous it might be suggested that - where a choice is possible - they should be 
discouraged, and those who persist in exercising this choice should accept the associated 
risks. Second, if we accept that people are entitled to walk or cycle, we may consider how the 
application of equal concern would frame fault in an accident resulting in harm or death.   
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4.1 Is there a responsibility to walk or cycle? 
Consider the argument that those who choose a dangerous activity – such as walking or 
cycling – should accept responsibility if they are injured as a result. Objections to such an 
argument may take the form that it lacks compassion, or that it is likely to lead to a risk-
averse society, or that it encourages a culture which expects people in a vulnerable position to 
retreat from, rather than question or challenge, threats. We do not here consider the merits of 
such objections. Instead we focus on a further objection that imposing responsibility in this 
way could result in wider injustice, including that created by failure to minimise deaths 
associated with transport.  Assessing risks of this wider injustice requires consideration of the 
impacts transport can have on factors including carbon emissions, other pollutants and the 
economy. 
Road transport is a major cause of carbon emissions – it accounts for over 16% of energy 
related global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in 2010 (IEA, 2012, p. 69).  In the UK 
the proportion is higher with around 20% of CO2 emissions coming from road transport in 
2010 and 21% in 2011 (DECC, 2013, Table 4). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) predict future problems internationally including coastal flooding, low crop 
yields, water shortages and more severe heat waves (IPCC, 2007, pp.11-12).  
Further ‘[r]oad transport contributes to significant emissions of NO2 (30%) and PM10 
(18%)…and is responsible for up to 70% of air pollution in urban areas’ (HCEAC, 2010, 
p.5). While emphasising the uncertainty in the calculations, the Committee on the Medical 
Effects of Air Pollutants report that in the UK air pollution has: 
‘an effect on mortality in 2008 equivalent to nearly 29,000 deaths in the UK at typical 
ages and an associated loss of total population life of 340,000 life-years. The burden 
can also be represented as a loss of life expectancy from birth of approximately six 
months.’ (COMEAP, 2010, pp. 1-2) 
The mortality associated with poor air quality and probable impacts of climate change 
implies that (equal) concern for people’s lives requires moves to less-polluting transport, 
including walking and cycling (Blondel et al., 2011; Higgins, 2005). Yet should 
responsibility for increasing use of less polluting modes rest primarily with individuals, or 
should it be a collective responsibility to alter conditions to promote those modes? The 
account of equal concern incorporates some individual responsibility for others’ safety, but 
limits this responsibility to prevent it becoming so onerous as to deny a person their own 
entitlement to safety. Where walkers and cyclists face relatively high risks, placing 
responsibility on individuals to take up walking or cycling involves asking them to accept an 
increased physical risk. Although the additional probability of being seriously injured or 
killed is small, the potential consequences are obviously severe (cf. Berdica, 2002, pp. 118-
9). This consideration points to a collective responsibility to create conditions which mean 
that it would be justifiable to expect people to walk or cycle.   
This argument faces a potential objection in the form of claims that to create conditions to 
support walking and cycling will result in other impacts which will ultimately result in harm 
or loss of life. One candidate of this type would be concern about detrimental economic 
impacts. Given the complexity involved, it is far beyond the scope of this paper to consider 
potential economic impacts of significant support for measures on cycling.
9
 However we can 
                                                          
9
 There is significant uncertainty about the relationship between transport and economy, although transport 
models might predict economic dis-benefits if measures increase journey time or impose costs on certain travel 
modes (see for instance, Banister, 2008 and 2012; Martin, 2006, Marsden et al. 2013; Quddus et al., 2007). This 
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frame the way in which economic impacts (or indeed other impacts) would be assessed by a 
conception of equal concern.  The questions relevant for this assessment are not solely 
concerned with identifying and quantifying economic impacts. Instead they extend to a 
second set of questions which ask whether there are reasons to hold that these impacts would 
be severe enough to result in injuries, harms, and inequalities, comparable to those prevented 
by the application of equal concern.  
 
4.2 Reasonable conditions, behaviour and fault 
While we can claim there is a case for walking and cycling, there remains the second 
question of what the application of equal concern implies for understanding of attribution of 
responsibility and fault. One approach to this question would be to follow the current 
standards implied by law and guidance in a given jurisdiction (see Fedtke, 2003).  However 
this begs the question of whether current standards should be used to judge whether 
individuals are held responsible for their own injuries or deaths. Recall that we are suggesting 
that people are entitled to access to travel, and that there should be an aim of avoiding 
inequalities in risks of physical harm that people face. So assessing ‘fault’ for the present 
purpose involves an idea of how someone exercising their entitlement to travel might 
reasonably be expected to behave in order to mitigate risks. Carsten et al., (1989) in a study 
of contributory factors in road accidents developed an idea of the ‘reasonable road user’ 
against which they compared the behaviours of their sample of accident participants. In this 
case the reasonable road user was felt to be of a standard greater than the average road user, 
though the study did not differentiate between different types of road users nor their 
capabilities. Arguably any test of reasonable behaviour would have to take account of the 
capacity of the traveller, so for instance we might have a less stringent requirement for 
children who make flawed judgements of vehicle speed (Howarth and Gunn, 1982).
10
 Further 
judgment of whether injury to one’s self should be discounted in measures of equality, 
involves assessment of whether the injured person’s actions which causally contributed to the 
accident were a response to conditions (e.g. poor infrastructure), creating an obstacle to 
access to travel. This assessment requires an account of what equal concern implies for 
entitlement to access to given modes of travel, and entitlement to given conditions for travel.  
How could we assess whether the injury resulted, at least in part, from an attempt to 
overcome obstacles to effective travel by foot or bicycle? Relevant factors may include 
determination of whether networks (i.e. door-to-door routes
11
) for pedestrians or cyclists are 
broken (e.g. by major roads without adequate crossings, or by parked vehicles obstructing the 
footway). In such cases an attempt to overcome the obstacle might mitigate attribution of 
fault to the pedestrian or cyclist for an injury they suffer in consequence. This suggestion 
requires some clarification. First we can note that it sets a rather low standard for ‘effective’ 
travel by foot or bicycle, only suggesting that a barrier to effective travel occurs where the 
traveller is exposed to significant risk in overcoming the barrier.
12
  However, the point at 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
is complicated by economic costs of aspects such as injury, illness, inaccessibility to services and opportunities, 
climate associated with transport, climate change. 
10
 We cannot avoid this objection to discounting by any appeal to the idea that a carer should take responsibility, 
since any failure on the carer’s part would not justify societal lack of concern for the welfare of whoever they 
are caring for. 
11
 That is the whole public road network (excluding those roads where pedestrians and cyclists are not 
permitted) and all other public rights of way.  
12
  This leaves open the possibility of arguing that barriers to effective travel can be caused by factors that do not 
necessarily impose risk of physical harm, but which might, for instance, add significantly to journey length.  
Within this article there is not space to explore this further possibility.   
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issue here should not be conflated with questions of liability or justification for causing injury 
or risk to others. If the action, albeit intended to avoid an obstacle to travel, created greater 
risk or injury to others, then it might violate others’ entitlement to equal safety and as such 
would not be defensible.   
Further, to claim that fault should not be attributed, or that it should be mitigated, requires 
that the actions were reasonable. Applying this criterion could involve frequent disagreement 
about whether conditions amount to an obstacle, and so whether someone’s action to avoid it 
is reasonable.  For instance, the CIHT point to cases of pedestrians choosing to cross a road 
with no crossing rather than use what is held to be an intimidating underpass (CIHT, 2010, 
para. 9.1.10). Similarly shared foot- and cycle-ways may be considered to improve safety for 
cyclists relative to the risks of cycling on the carriageway. However, evidence suggests 
obstructions, and the need to cross junctions joining the carriageway, present significant risks 
to people using these cycle-ways (Reid and Adams, 2010, p. 20). In individual cases, the 
scope for dispute may centre on whether specific conditions increase or mitigate risk, and 
hence whether walkers or cyclists act reasonably or can be held to be at fault, in failing to use 
infrastructure provided. Given the potential disagreement we might consider where the 
burden of proof should lie in determining reasonableness, or whether the uncertainty means 
we should give up any attempt to assess fault in these cases. If we adopt the latter approach 
then no further consideration would be needed (cf. Harris, 1995). On the former approach we 
should note that since we are discussing civil not criminal responsibility we would not require 
proof beyond reasonable doubt.  Nevertheless there are other reasons to suggest that a high 
burden of proof would be required in relation to any idea that society has limited 
responsibility to attempt to reduce risks to people held to be responsible for those risks.  
These reasons stem from the argument that one of society’s most important obligations is to 
protect people’s lives. So we require a high standard of proof if we are to suggest limiting 
that concern for life.  
 
5. A framework for judging the application of equal concern to walking and cycling  
In this section we review the discussion in previous sections in order to develop a framework 
to guide policy affecting walking and cycling so that they are consistent with an overarching 
aim of showing equal concern (Figure 2).  We began from the argument that equal concern 
rests on the normative assumption that each person matters, and given this we can make a 
case that we have collective responsibility to provide conditions which protect people’s lives 
and health, and which enable people to access social, economic, political and personal 
opportunities and activities.   In Section 2, we argued that applying equal concern to transport 
involves two non-hierarchical priorities of concern both to reduce absolute levels and 
inequalities in physical risks and harm, and to ensure that each person has access to some 
means of transport which enables them to get on with their lives. A framing factor for each 
priority is the requirement that provision for one person should not undermine the ability to 
provide for others.  The multiple impacts and uses of transport mean that in their application, 
these two priorities must have a broad scope. So in thinking about the priority of access to 
some form of transport, we should examine whether that which is available, is adequate for 
enabling participation by each member of society. However this involves moving beyond 
consideration of accessibility for individuals’ in isolation and requires that we examine 
whether provision which is suitable for some can result in barriers in accessibility for others.  
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[Insert Figure 2: Application of equal concern to walking and cycling ] 
 
Sections 3 and 4 sought to flesh out how to apply to walking and cycling, the priorities of 
equal concern to reduce absolute levels and inequalities in physical risks and harm, and to 
ensure that each has access to some means of transport.  One of the most significant points to 
emerge from these Sections is the extent to which the two priorities interact, each influencing 
the application of the other.  The reason is again due to the complexity of transport’s impacts 
and uses.  Recognising this interaction is central to assessing conditions and guiding policy 
affecting walking and cycling. First, this interaction plays a key role in defining the 
conditions relevant to designing policy approaches affecting walking and cycling. One 
condition combines aspects of each priority to make the normative assertion that each person 
is entitled to access some form of transport, and that this access should come at the cost of 
exposure to high levels of risk (Figure 2, box [H]).  This does not mean that people are 
entitled to access any transport mode, or that use of all transport modes should be protected 
by policy, however considered alone, the condition offers little indication of what transport 
modes should be available, and the contexts in which they may justifiably be used. So the 
claim that people have some entitlement to travel as they need this to get on with their lives, 
does not alone enable us to indicate what travel, or what travel purposes, are reasonable.  We 
can only begin to interpret this claim when it is considered in conjunction with the idea that 
policy based on equal concern should consider all transport related deaths.  As we argued in 
Section 4, there is a case for saying there is societal responsibility to support walking and 
cycling, and under certain conditions an individual responsibility to walk or cycle, on the 
basis that greater use of these modes may result in fewer deaths associated with transport 
(Figure 2, box [I]). By taking account of these conditions we can start to identify principles to 
underpin policy.  These conditions support the idea that walking and cycling are (at least 
among) those modes which people should be entitled to use as means of accessing 
opportunities and activities (Figure 2, box [J]).  Given this, pedestrians and cyclists should be 
able to expect conditions in which they are not exposed to disproportionately high risks 
(Figure 2, box [K]).  In interpreting this principle we can recall that equal concern implies 
both individual and collective responsibilities, so as we discussed in Section 4.2, cyclists and 
pedestrians would not avoid some responsibility for safety. However a policy approach which 
does not aim to remove inequalities in risk would not be defensible.   
These conditions and principles can be used to assess existing conditions for pedestrians and 
cyclists according to the idea of showing equal concern. So we have criteria by which to 
judge whether, or the extent to which, pedestrians and cyclists face relevant inequalities in 
relation to exposure to physical harms (Figure 2, [M]). We also have an indication of how to 
judge whether conditions for walking and cycling amount to a barrier to accessibility which is 
unjustifiable on the basis of equal concern (Figure 2, [N]). The question, if irrelevant 
inequalities are identified, is how they should be addressed.  It would be far beyond the scope 
of this paper to identify measures which might be effective in reducing inequalities in 
different contexts. However we can identify relevant policy areas and use the the argument 
developed through this paper to guide policy development, particularly by providing a basis 
for dealing with policy problems and challenges.   
 
Policy approaches in transport planning, law and enforcement appear central to mitigating 
inequalities in safety and accessibility. Our previous discussion has emphasised how barriers 
to walking and cycling can involve infrastructure problems as well as behaviour such as 
pavement parking and inappropriate driving speed. There would be substantial implications 
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of a policy approach which sought to mitigate these problems so that (door to door) networks 
can be travelled on foot or bicycle without disproportionate risk (Figure 2, [N], [O], [P]).  
This might involve restrictions for motor vehicles, through measures such as pricing or 
outright limitations on road use or speed. This could be expected to meet with charges either 
that it violates car occupants’ entitlement to accessibility, or if pricing is used, that it is unfair 
due to inequalities in wealth. This charge relating to accessibility could be justified, but only 
if it made driving impossible, and then only under certain circumstances, for instance where 
occupants are unable to walk or cycle, or where distances make walking or cycling 
unfeasible.  Similarly, equal concern could support claims that pricing measures are unfair, 
but only if preventing motor travel for people with no other ability to (safely) access 
opportunities and activities.  The application of equal concern could have the effect of 
constraining planning likely to increase distances travelled, such as planning for services or 
retail developments located away from residential areas. One reason would be that increasing 
travel distances would tend to be at odds with the societal responsibility to support 
accessibility by walking or cycling. Further, planning anticipated to increase volumes of 
motor traffic would be complicated by the priority of ensuring that networks are walkable and 
cycleable. Finally, as we outlined in Section 5, the further expected objection to planning 
based on equal concern would be that it would result in damage to economic growth.  We 
have suggested that, if equal concern underpins policy, this objection needs to meet a high 
standard in which there is, at least, reason to maintain that the economic harm resulting from 
the measures would result in greater relevant inequalities than existed previously (Figure 2, 
[Q]).  
 
6. Conclusions 
We have argued that there is a case for treating walking and cycling as a subject relevant to 
consideration of what it is for society to show equal concern for its members. We might 
question whether framing walking and cycling as a particular concern for a just society will 
be effective in making the case for measures to improve conditions. Even if the argument for 
this framing is accepted we might expect multiple obstacles to its application. We have noted 
arguments that societies have become organised on the basis of high use of private motor 
transport which in addition to its impact on land use, shapes social and economic 
arrangements (cf. Whitelegg, 1997; Urry, 2004). Therefore if measures which could support 
walking and cycling would also restrict the ways in which motor vehicles are used, then this 
might be held to present (at least short term) problems in some people’s everyday lives. 
Perhaps relatedly, it is apparent that there is political and cultural support for preserving or 
enhancing conditions for motor vehicle use (see for instance, Williams, 2010; CLG, 2011; 
Schwanen et al. 2012).  Further we would not underestimate how the application of equal 
concern could present challenges for planning, especially if measures required by equal 
concern are believed to have some detrimental economic impacts. Nevertheless the framing 
defended in this paper might enable walking and cycling to be understood not only as 
potential means of gaining certain benefits, but as a part of a more fundamental moral 
concern. Despite difficulties of  application, this could assist in strengthening arguments for 
walking and cycling in ongoing debate on law, policy and planning.   
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Figure 1: Principle of equal concern and its application to transport policy, planning and law 
 
[A] Individuals have entitlement to safety 
and to means of and sustaining life, and 
conducting social, political, economic 
and personal activities       
[B] Individual entitlement limited by 
equal entitlement of others.  This 
does not allow levelling down (Harris 
1997). 
 
High level policy principles 
 
 
[C] Collective (governmental and societal) and individual responsibility 
to contribute to realising entitlement for self and others  
Factors guiding implementation 
 
 
[D] 
[G] Collective and individual responsibility to 
contribute to achieving transport priorities 
   
High-level priorities  
 
[F] Transport behaviour and choice can be 
restricted by others’ entitlement to use some mode 
of transport and to equal safety.  
 
 
[E]  
Recognise individuals’ entitlement to 
access and means of using some 
mode of effective transport. 
Recognise entitlement to equal safety 
so minimise inequalities in risks  
Minimise deaths associated with 
transport (i.e. from collision, pollution, 
climate change, lack of transport) 
 
AND 
And 
Equal Concern  
(Overarching principle) 
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Factors guiding implementation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Application of equal concern to walking and cycling  
Application of equal concern to transport policy, planning and law  
Two (non-hierarchical) high-level priorities  
 Minimise deaths associated with transport (i.e. from collision, pollution, climate change, 
lack of transport), with condition that minimise inequalities in risks  
 Recognise individuals’ entitlement to access and means of using some mode of effective transport. 
 Factors guiding implementation 
 Collective and individual responsibility to contribute to achieving transport priorities  
 Transport behaviour and choice can be restricted by others’ entitlement to use some mode 
of transport and to equal safety.  
 
 
Framework for application of equal concern to walking and cycling  
 
Factors guiding assessment of conditions and measures for change  
[L] Indication of safety inequality obtained by transport statistics on rates of death for distance travelled  
 
[M] Indication of accessibility inequality obtained by identifying obstacles in network 
 
[N] Transport planning to provide physical infrastructure meets standards of accessibility and safety for 
walking and cycling  
 
[O] Restriction on mode choice and transport behaviour permissible to realise others’ entitlements to 
equality of safety and access to transport 
 
[P] Liability and fault informed by individual responsibility and entitlement to equality of safety and some 
access to transport  
 
[Q] Economic impact of measures on walking and cycling relevant only if expected to result in greater 
inequality than is removed by the measures 
 
 
Principles for policy on walking and cycling 
 
 
 Relevant conditions 
 
[H] Increased walking and cycling 
is a potential means of reducing all 
deaths associated with transport  
[I] Individuals’ entitled to equal safety 
and to access and means of using 
some mode of effective transport  
  AND 
[J] Walking and cycling among modes 
people entitled to use as (effective) 
transport 
[K] Pedestrians and cyclists entitled to 
safety levels equal to safety associated 
with other transport modes  
